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NO. 48673-2021
ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-20-31952

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After Rick Anderson pled guilty to aggravated assault, the district court sentenced him to
serve five years, with two-and-one-half years fixed. Mr. Anderson appeals, and he argues that
the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In August 2020, the State filed a criminal complaint alleging that Mr. Anderson
committed the crimes of aggravated assault, misdemeanor violation of a no contact order, and
misdemeanor malicious injury to property.

(R., pp.9-10.)
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According to the Presentence

Investigation Report (“PSI”),1 Mr. Anderson showed up at a business where his ex-girlfriend,
Luana Yokom, was getting her car fixed. (PSI, p.12.) Mr. Anderson ultimately slammed the
driver’s side door of his truck on Ms. Yokom and then drove away. (PSI, p.12.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Anderson pled guilty to aggravated assault and
misdemeanor violation of a no contact order.2 (Tr., p.15, L.19—p.18, L.9; R., pp.63-74.) At
sentencing, the State recommended a sentence of five years, with two-and-one-half years fixed,
for the aggravated assault charge and asked that the sentence be executed. (Tr., p.35, Ls.8-10,
p.40, Ls.24-25.) Mr. Anderson requested that the district court sentence him to five years, with
two-and-one-half years fixed, suspended for probation. (Tr., p.43, Ls.2-9.) The district court
sentenced Mr. Anderson to serve a term of five years, with two-and-one-half years fixed, for
aggravated assault.3 (Tr., p.56, L.22—p.57, L.2; R., pp.81-84.) Mr. Anderson timely appealed
from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.90-92.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Anderson to serve five years,
with two-and-one-half years fixed, for aggravated assault?
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Citations to the PSI refer to the 177-page electronic document with the confidential sentencing
materials, titled “Appeal Confidential Exhibits 04-12-2021 12.22.54 46033899 BF02E358ED0B-4B03-BF50-872F2CEBB9DB.”
2
While this case was pending, Mr. Anderson was charged in a separate criminal complaint in
Boise County, case number CR08-20-1651. (R., pp.29-32). The plea agreement in this case was
part of a global resolution that included Mr. Anderson entering a plea to a misdemeanor violation
of a no contact order in that Boise County case. (R., p.72; Tr., p.6, L.17—p.7, L.11.) The other
charges from the Boise County case, as well as the misdemeanor malicious injury to property
charge in this case, were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. (R., p.72; Tr., p.6, L.17—
p.7, L.11.) The State also agreed as part of the plea agreement that it would not pursue a
persistent violator enhancement. (R., p.73.)
3
For the misdemeanor no contact order violation, the district court sentenced Mr. Anderson to
one-hundred-and-sixty-eight days, concurrent with the aggravated assault, with one-hundredand-sixty-eight days credit from time served. (Tr., p.57, Ls.16-20; R., p.82.)
2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Anderson To Serve Five Years,
With Two-And-One-Half Years Fixed, For Aggravated Assault
“Where the sentence imposed by a trial court is within statutory limits, ‘the appellant
bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.’” State v. Windom, 150
Idaho 873, 875 (2011) (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the
sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018). In this matter, Mr. Anderson’s sentence
does not exceed the statutory maximum. See I.C. § 18-906 (five-year maximum). Accordingly,
to show that the sentence imposed was unreasonable, Mr. Anderson “must show that the
sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.”
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘[R]easonableness’” implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to the
purposes for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App.
1982).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008), abrogated in part by, State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661
(2020). “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of
protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or
retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
3

In this case, Mr. Anderson asserts that the district court did not exercise reason and
therefore abused its discretion by imposing a sentence that is excessive under any reasonable
view of the facts. Specifically, Mr. Anderson contends the district court should have sentenced
him to probation in light of the mitigating factors, including his community support, mental
condition, substance abuse issues, and expressions of remorse for his actions.
First, the support and good character letters from Mr. Anderson’s family and friends
stand in favor of mitigation. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594–95 (1982) (reducing
defendant’s sentence upon a finding of family support and good character as mitigation); see
State v. Ball, 149 Idaho 658, 663–64 (Ct. App. 2010) (finding that the district court
acknowledged family and friend support as mitigating circumstances). Fourteen individuals
prepared letters in support of Mr. Anderson. (PSI, pp.57-68, 173-76.) According to the letters,
Mr. Anderson is “a good man” that “tries to help people when he can” (PSI, p.57), is a “decent
and moral human being” and “honorable family man” (PSI, p.58), has “always been encouraging
and supportive” (PSI, p.59), has “always put others first” and is “always there, for problems big
and small, expecting nothing in return” (PSI, p.60), has been “a great support” and would give
others “the shirt off his back” (PSI, p.61), is “kind, giving, loving, respectful, well-respected in
the community, a stranger to no one and friend to many” (PSI, pp.62-63), “would do anything to
help out a person in need” (PSI, p.64), was “always kind and professional” (PSI, p.65), has “had
compassion for people that are less fortunate” (PSI, p.66), is “a good person that just got on the
wrong path” (PSI, p.67), has “great integrity” (PSI, p.68), is an “honest man” (PSI, p.173), and
was “always very calm and understanding when it came to teaching others” (PSI, p.176).
According to the presentence investigator, Mr. Anderson “[v]oiced prosocial beliefs during
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presentence interview.” (PSI, p.16.) Mr. Anderson’s community support and prosocial beliefs
are mitigating factors that support a lesser sentence.
Second, Mr. Anderson’s mental condition is a significant mitigating factor that supports
leniency in sentencing. The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 not
only suggests, but requires, the trial court to consider a defendant’s mental illness as a sentencing
factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). If a defendant’s mental condition is a
significant factor, then Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the court to consider factors such as: (a)
the extent to which the defendant is mentally ill; (b) the degree of illness or defect and level of
functional impairment; (c) the prognosis for improvement or rehabilitation; (d) the availability of
treatment and level of care required; (e) any risk of danger which the defendant may create for
the public if not incarcerated, or the lack of such risk; and (f) the capacity of the defendant to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the
requirements of the law at the time of the offense charged.

“The factors listed in Idaho

Code § 19–2523 provide a manner in which to evaluate the mental health information presented
to the sentencing court.” Strand, 137 Idaho at 461.
Mr. Anderson’s mental health was evaluated as part of his Global Appraisal of Individual
Needs (“GAIN”) assessment. (PSI, pp.36-45.) In addition, a Department of Health and Welfare
Mental Health Examination Report was prepared for Mr. Anderson pursuant to Idaho Code § 192524. (PSI, pp.46-48.) In those assessments, Mr. Anderson was given provisional diagnoses for
“Major Depressive Disorder, Single Episode, Mild – Provisional” and “Generalized Anxiety
Disorder”. (PSI, pp.37, 46.) According to the mental health report, “Rick Anderson presents
with mental health needs as noted above and mental health treatment is recommended to
minimize risk of further deterioration of functioning and to monitor for any ongoing risk.” (PSI,
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p.48.) The report also stated that “without some form of treatment, it is likely [Mr. Anderson]
will continue to struggle with symptoms and problems may increase.” (PSI, p.48.)
During the presentence investigation, Mr. Anderson reported that he suffered significant
injuries following a car accident in July 2019.

(PSI, pp.15-16.)

During that accident,

Mr. Anderson suffered a “severe concussion with traumatic brain injury”, a “shattered pelvic
bone”, and “neuropathy on his left foot”.4 (PSI, p.15.) Since that accident, Mr. Anderson noted
that he began to have “anxiety attacks, stress and ‘emotions I don’t understand.’” (PSI, p.15.) In
her victim impact statement provided in the presentence investigation report, Ms. Yokom stated
that Mr. Anderson “had been good to her up until he was in a car accident” and that “she would
like to think the defendant’s actions were due in large part to the car accident and brain damage
suffered from that accident.”5 (PSI, p.13.)
In a concussion evaluation prepared by Saint Alphonsus Rehabilitation Services shortly
after his accident in July 2019, Mr. Anderson was diagnosed with moderately severe postconcussive symptoms. (PSI, p.80.) According to the evaluation, Mr. Anderson “demonstrates
functional breakdowns in the areas of short-term memory and verbal expression at the
conversational level.” (PSI, p.81.) The evaluator diagnosed Mr. Anderson with a “cognitive
communication deficit” following the accident.

(PSI, p.79.)

After that initial evaluation,

Mr. Anderson continued to regularly engage in physical and psychological therapy. (PSI, pp.83110.)
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In an attached neuropsychological consultation report, Mr. Anderson’s medical records
“indicated that the patient had a bad acetabular fracture location with the peroneal nerve palsy
from the sciatic nerve. The patient also reportedly had pelvic fractures.” (PSI, p.71.)
5
While Mr. Anderson was in custody, Ms. Yokom attempted to contact Mr. Anderson “by phone
and messaged more than 30 times, all of which have gone unanswered.” (Tr., p.48, Ls.11-20.)
6

A few days before committing the offenses at issue in this case, Mr. Anderson
proactively attended a neuropsychological consultation to address issues he had been
experiencing since the car accident.

(PSI, pp.71-74.)

At that consultation, Mr. Anderson

reported that he had experienced “waves of severe anxiety”, “his frustration tolerance is very
short”, his brain was “all over the place”, he “cannot concentrate”, and there are times where he
will “draw a blank when trying to retrieve information.” (PSI, p.71.) The psychologist that
participated in the consultation noted that Mr. Anderson “is very anxious and restive. He has
difficulty regulating his emotions. His frustration tolerance is low. He certainly is sad and
blue.” (PSI, p.73.) The psychologist recommended that Mr. Anderson “enter into psychological
treatment to address his ongoing depression, anxiety, anger, and poor emotional regulation.
Once he stabilizes emotionally, we will likely pursue formal neuropsychological testing.” (PSI,
p.74.) Even after Mr. Anderson was charged in this case, he participate in another follow-up
neuropsychological consultation. (PSI, p.75.) At that time, Mr. Anderson reported “ongoing
difficulties with sustained attention, short-term memory, and neurobehavioral changes.” (PSI,
p.75.)
At sentencing, defense counsel explained that Mr. Anderson had been actively meeting
with a social worker on a weekly basis for the previous six months while incarcerated.
(Tr., p.43, L.23—p.44, L.14.) Defense counsel stated that Mr. Anderson would continue to work
with the social worker if he was released onto probation and that the social worker had helped set
up an assessment with Human Supports of Idaho for Mr. Anderson so that he could continue to
work on his behavioral health therapy plan. (Tr., p.44, Ls.9-14; see also PSI, pp.172, 174-75,
177.)

In a report prepared on Mr. Anderson’s behalf, the social worker explained that

“[t]hroughout the course of sixteen therapy visits, Rick has expressed increasing insight and

7

judgment.” (PSI, p.174.) Furthermore, the social worker found that Mr. Anderson “expressed
evolving beliefs in the importance of mental health and engaging in counseling/psychotherapy
that will encourage his ongoing participation in treatment.” (PSI, p.174.) The social worker
observed that Mr. Anderson “has worked to further develop his emotional vocabulary,
understand locus of control, accept responsibility, express empathy, and increase insight of how
his beliefs and self-understanding have impacted his past actions and willingness to participate in
treatment.” (PSI, p.174.) While in custody in this case, Mr. Anderson also completed courses on
“anger management, cognitive awareness, contentious relationships, healthy relationships,
substance abuse, thinking skills, and so on.” (Tr., p.49, Ls.11-17; see also PSI, pp.69-70.)
Defense counsel asserted at sentencing that while Mr. Anderson had prior convictions,
Mr. Anderson did not have a “violent past” and his criminal convictions were “over or about 20
years ago.”6

(Tr., p.45, L.22—p.46, L.16.)

Defense counsel further explained that

Mr. Anderson’s family, including his wife of thirty years and his sister, had not observed “this
sort of violent behavior from Rick before” and that the car accident may have triggered
something in Mr. Anderson’s brain that made him feel and react differently. (Tr., p.46, Ls.3-16.)
Defense counsel stated that Mr. Anderson is amenable to treatment and to changing his behavior
if given the opportunity to do so. (Tr., p.46, Ls.3-16.)

6

There was an over fifteen year gap in time between Mr. Anderson’s conviction for felony
escape in 2004 and his conviction for misdemeanor battery in 2020. (PSI, p.20-22.) At
sentencing, district court emphasized that Mr. Anderson “had a disturbing the peace that was
reduced from a battery for which you were convicted that arose before the accident occurred.
That’s violent behavior that had nothing to do with the accident, and it’s more evidence of
criminal thinking.” (Tr., p.55, Ls.19-24.) However, defense counsel explained that the
disturbing the peace charge referenced by the district court was actually dismissed after
Mr. Anderson appealed the conviction, and the district court acknowledged that that case was
dismissed. (Tr., p.32, Ls.11-20; see also PSI, p.21 (listing the disposition of the disturbing the
peace case as “Amended Disposition 04/29/19 – Dismissed.”).)
8

At sentencing, Mr. Anderson explained that “[p]rior to that accident, I didn’t really feel
like I had all the emotions and feelings and that sort of thing that I do after the accident. I never
experienced that kind of stuff before.” (Tr., p.51, Ls.8-11.) Mr. Anderson stated that he realized
that he was having issues prior to the charges arising in this case, and that he told his wife that he
“needed to talk with somebody, I needed to get some help.” (Tr., p.51, Ls.16-19.) Mr. Anderson
asserted that he “got ahold of a Dr. Calhoun and started and went in for testing -- several tests, or
whatever -- prior to coming to jail.” (Tr., p.51, Ls.19-22; see PSI, pp.71-75.)
Despite the concerns raised throughout the presentence investigation report and by
Mr. Anderson and his counsel at sentencing regarding the car accident, the district court stated
that “while I appreciate that you want to assign a lot of the reasons for that to your accident, I am
not convinced that it plays as great a role as you would like me to believe.” (Tr., p.55, Ls.15-18.)
The district further determined that “the level of criminal thinking that existed prior to the
accident and that which exists subsequent to the accident doesn’t seem to have changed much.”
(Tr., p.56, Ls.13-16.)
Mr. Anderson asserts that the district court did not adequately consider his mental health
as a factor at sentencing as required under Idaho Code § 19-2523. Mr. Anderson’s mental health
was a significant factor, and substantial concerns were raised if Mr. Anderson does not receive
adequate treatment for his mental health needs. “The sentencing court is not required to recite
each of the factors listed.” Strand, 137 Idaho at 461. However, Mr. Andersons contends that the
district court did not give adequate consideration to the factors listed under Idaho
Code § 19-2523, and the lengthy prison sentence imposed suggests it did not. Mr. Anderson’s
mental condition stands in favor of mitigation and leniency in this case.
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Third, Mr. Anderson’s substance abuse issues, the impact of his substance abuse on his
behavior, his need for treatment, and his willingness to participate in treatment are strong factors
in mitigation. The impact of substance abuse on the defendant’s criminal conduct is “a proper
consideration in mitigation of punishment upon sentencing.” State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405,
414 n.5 (1981). Prior to sentencing, Mr. Anderson completed a GAIN assessment. (PSI, pp.3645.) In that assessment, Mr. Anderson self-reported symptoms sufficient to meet the criteria for
amphetamine use disorder severe and cannabis use disorder moderate. (PSI, pp.27-29.)
Mr. Anderson reported that he began using cannabis at the age of

(PSI, p.38.)

Mr. Anderson informed the evaluator that he had “consumed cannabis edibles daily for several
months before this incarceration”, and that his use of cannabis was “to deal with the permanent
nerve pain” in his “legs and feet.” (PSI, p.36.) Mr. Anderson also disclosed that he relapsed on
methamphetamine in February 2020. (PSI, p.36.) In the GAIN assessment, Mr. Anderson
“reported that he has quit using substances and is about 100% ready to remain abstinent.” (PSI,
p.41.)

Furthermore, Mr. Anderson completed a substance abuse course while in custody for

this case. (Tr., p.49, Ls.11-17; PSI, pp.69-70.) Prior to sentencing, Mr. Anderson worked with a
social worker to schedule an assessment through Human Supports of Idaho, and that program
included substance abuse sessions and substance use groups that would help Mr. Anderson if he
was released into the community. (Tr., p.44, Ls.9-14; PSI, p.172.)
At sentencing, defense counsel indicated that Mr. Anderson would comply with any court
ordered drug and alcohol testing and participate in level one outpatient substance abuse treatment
as was recommended in the GAIN assessment. (Tr., p.43, Ls.10-12, p.45, Ls.1-6; PSI, pp.4445.) Defense counsel further stated that there were potentially factors other than Mr. Anderson’s
car accident that contributed to his conduct in this case, including his relapse on
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methamphetamine.

(Tr., p.46, Ls.17-23.)

When discussing the viability of releasing

Mr. Anderson into the community, the presentence investigator noted that Mr. Anderson “does
appear motivated to participate in those treatment opportunities.” (PSI, p.24.) Mr. Anderson’s
substance use issues, the impact of his substance abuse on his behavior, his need for treatment,
and his willingness to participate in treatment are strong mitigating factors that support leniency
in this case.
Fourth, Mr. Anderson has expressed great remorse for his actions and accepted
responsibility for the crime. Acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and regret are all factors in
favor of mitigation.

State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982).

In the presentence

investigation report, Mr. Anderson told the investigator that he was “embarrassed” and felt
“extremely bad” for his conduct in this case. (PSI, p.13.) The presentence investigator noted
that Mr. Anderson “[e]xpressed remorse for actions” and that Mr. Anderson was “[w]illing to
accept consequences for actions and wishes to participate in further assessment and treatment.”
(PSI, p.16.)
At sentencing, Mr. Anderson informed the district court that he was “embarrassed and
ashamed” of his actions. (Tr., p.50, Ls.21-24.) Mr. Anderson also apologized to Ms. Yokom for
the harm that he caused her and stated that he was “extremely sorry for the loss of her mother
and the pain and suffering [he] caused her.”

(Tr., p.53, Ls.14-19.)

These statements of

acceptance, remorse, and regret stand in favor of mitigation.
In sum, Mr. Anderson maintains that the district court did not exercise reason at
sentencing because it failed to give adequate weight to the mitigating factors in his case. Proper
consideration of these factors supported his request for probation. Mr. Anderson submits that the
district court abused its discretion by not giving him an opportunity for probation.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Anderson respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 17th day of June, 2021.

/s/ Jacob L. Westerfield
JACOB L. WESTERFIELD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

JLW/eas

12

